feat(spec-05-auth-fallback-chain): worker (eng_flash_high) implementation
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
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import ast
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import ast
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import json
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import json
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import math
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import re
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import re
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import threading
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import threading
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import time
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import time
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@@ -137,7 +138,15 @@ class SanitizedAuthError(ConnpyError):
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self.code = code
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self.code = code
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self.__suppress_context__ = True
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self.__suppress_context__ = True
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self.__cause__ = None
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self.__cause__ = None
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self.__context__ = None
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@property
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def __context__(self) -> None:
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"""Never retain or expose an underlying exception context."""
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return None
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@__context__.setter
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def __context__(self, _value: BaseException | None) -> None:
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return
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def __reduce__(self) -> tuple[type[SanitizedAuthError], tuple[str, str]]:
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def __reduce__(self) -> tuple[type[SanitizedAuthError], tuple[str, str]]:
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msg = str(self.args[0]) if self.args else ""
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msg = str(self.args[0]) if self.args else ""
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@@ -237,8 +246,8 @@ def sanitize_log_message(message: str, *, secrets: Iterable[str] = ()) -> str:
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text = str(message) if message is not None else ""
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text = str(message) if message is not None else ""
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text = _ANSI_OSC_RE.sub("", text)
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text = _ANSI_OSC_RE.sub("", text)
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text = _ANSI_CSI_RE.sub("", text)
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text = _ANSI_CSI_RE.sub("", text)
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text = redact_known_secrets(text, secrets=secrets, min_len=4)
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text = _CONTROL_CHAR_RE.sub("", text)
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return _CONTROL_CHAR_RE.sub("", text)
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return redact_known_secrets(text, secrets=secrets, min_len=1)
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def sanitize_exception(
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def sanitize_exception(
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@@ -278,7 +287,7 @@ def raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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secrets: Iterable[str] = (),
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secrets: Iterable[str] = (),
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context_label: str = "",
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context_label: str = "",
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) -> NoReturn:
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) -> NoReturn:
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"""Clear original frames and raise SanitizedAuthError with cause suppressed."""
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"""Clear original frames and raise SanitizedAuthError with cause and context suppressed."""
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err: SanitizedAuthError | None = None
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err: SanitizedAuthError | None = None
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try:
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try:
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err = sanitize_exception(
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err = sanitize_exception(
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@@ -293,6 +302,8 @@ def raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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clear_exception_frames(orig_exc)
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clear_exception_frames(orig_exc)
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del orig_exc
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del orig_exc
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del secrets
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del secrets
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err.__context__ = None
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err.__cause__ = None
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raise err from None
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raise err from None
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@@ -311,19 +322,22 @@ def validate_strict_int_range(
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def _check_depth(obj: Any, max_depth: int, cur_depth: int = 0) -> None:
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def _check_depth(obj: Any, max_depth: int, cur_depth: int = 0) -> None:
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"""Verify container nesting depth does not exceed max_depth."""
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"""Verify container nesting depth does not exceed max_depth iteratively."""
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if isinstance(obj, (dict, list, tuple)):
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stack: list[tuple[Any, int]] = [(obj, cur_depth)]
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next_depth = cur_depth + 1
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while stack:
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cur_obj, depth = stack.pop()
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if isinstance(cur_obj, (dict, list, tuple)):
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next_depth = depth + 1
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if next_depth > max_depth:
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if next_depth > max_depth:
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raise ValueError(f"JSON nesting exceeds maximum depth of {max_depth}")
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raise ValueError(f"JSON nesting exceeds maximum depth of {max_depth}")
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if isinstance(obj, dict):
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if isinstance(cur_obj, dict):
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for k, v in obj.items():
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for k, v in cur_obj.items():
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if not isinstance(k, str):
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if not isinstance(k, str):
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raise TypeError("JSON object keys must be strings")
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raise TypeError("JSON object keys must be strings")
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_check_depth(v, max_depth, next_depth)
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stack.append((v, next_depth))
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else:
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else:
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for item in obj:
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for item in cur_obj:
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_check_depth(item, max_depth, next_depth)
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stack.append((item, next_depth))
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def validate_json_depth_and_size(
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def validate_json_depth_and_size(
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@@ -334,9 +348,14 @@ def validate_json_depth_and_size(
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) -> Any:
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) -> Any:
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"""Parse (if str) and enforce byte length and nesting depth limits on JSON inputs."""
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"""Parse (if str) and enforce byte length and nesting depth limits on JSON inputs."""
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if isinstance(raw_or_obj, str):
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if isinstance(raw_or_obj, str):
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if len(raw_or_obj.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")) > max_bytes:
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if len(raw_or_obj) > max_bytes or len(raw_or_obj.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")) > max_bytes:
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raise ValueError(f"JSON input exceeds maximum size of {max_bytes} bytes")
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raise ValueError(f"JSON input exceeds maximum size of {max_bytes} bytes")
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try:
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parsed = json.loads(raw_or_obj)
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parsed = json.loads(raw_or_obj)
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except RecursionError:
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raise ValueError(
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f"JSON nesting exceeds maximum depth of {max_depth}"
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) from None
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else:
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else:
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parsed = raw_or_obj
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parsed = raw_or_obj
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_check_depth(parsed, max_depth, 0)
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_check_depth(parsed, max_depth, 0)
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@@ -550,18 +569,25 @@ def _resolve_compose_internal(
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if tok_type in ("escaped_lit", "quoted_lit", "bare_lit"):
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if tok_type in ("escaped_lit", "quoted_lit", "bare_lit"):
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term_vals = [tok_val]
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term_vals = [tok_val]
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elif tok_type == "rsa_blob":
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elif tok_type == "rsa_blob":
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if decrypt_fn is not None:
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if decrypt_fn is None:
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raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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code="NO_CREDS",
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context_label="cannot decrypt compose rsa_blob without decrypt_fn",
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)
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san_err: SanitizedAuthError | None = None
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decrypted: Any = None
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try:
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try:
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decrypted = decrypt_fn(tok_val)
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decrypted = decrypt_fn(tok_val)
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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san_err = sanitize_exception(
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exc,
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exc,
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code="AUTH_FAILED",
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code="AUTH_FAILED",
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context_label="failed to decrypt compose rsa_blob",
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context_label="failed to decrypt compose rsa_blob",
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)
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)
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if san_err is not None:
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san_err.__context__ = None
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raise san_err from None
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term_vals = [str(decrypted)]
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term_vals = [str(decrypted)]
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else:
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term_vals = [tok_val]
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elif tok_type == "profile_ref":
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elif tok_type == "profile_ref":
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if tok_val in visited:
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if tok_val in visited:
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raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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@@ -621,20 +647,27 @@ def _resolve_compose_internal(
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)
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)
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term_vals.extend(sub_vals)
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term_vals.extend(sub_vals)
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elif is_rsa_blob(item):
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elif is_rsa_blob(item):
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if decrypt_fn is not None:
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if decrypt_fn is None:
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raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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code="NO_CREDS",
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context_label="cannot decrypt profile password rsa_blob without decrypt_fn",
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)
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san_item_err: SanitizedAuthError | None = None
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dec_item: Any = None
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try:
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try:
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dec_item = decrypt_fn(item)
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dec_item = decrypt_fn(item)
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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san_item_err = sanitize_exception(
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exc,
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exc,
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code="AUTH_FAILED",
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code="AUTH_FAILED",
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context_label="failed to decrypt profile password in compose",
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context_label="failed to decrypt profile password in compose",
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)
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)
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if san_item_err is not None:
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san_item_err.__context__ = None
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raise san_item_err from None
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term_vals.append(str(dec_item))
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term_vals.append(str(dec_item))
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else:
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else:
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term_vals.append(item)
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term_vals.append(item)
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else:
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term_vals.append(item)
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if len(term_vals) > max_variants:
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if len(term_vals) > max_variants:
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raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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raise_sanitized_auth_error(
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code="AUTH_FAILED",
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code="AUTH_FAILED",
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@@ -737,7 +770,7 @@ def mask_node_secrets(obj: Any) -> Any:
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k_lower = k.lower() if isinstance(k, str) else str(k).lower()
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k_lower = k.lower() if isinstance(k, str) else str(k).lower()
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if _mask_secret_key(k_lower):
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if _mask_secret_key(k_lower):
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out[k] = "***"
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out[k] = "***"
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elif k_lower == "fallback":
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elif k_lower in ("fallback", "_fallback"):
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if isinstance(v, (dict, list, tuple)):
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if isinstance(v, (dict, list, tuple)):
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out[k] = _recurse(v, in_fallback_list=True)
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out[k] = _recurse(v, in_fallback_list=True)
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elif v in ("", None):
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elif v in ("", None):
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@@ -800,7 +833,17 @@ def validate_fallback_entries(
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if not stripped:
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if not stripped:
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return []
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return []
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if stripped.startswith(("[", "{")):
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if stripped.startswith(("[", "{")):
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if (
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len(stripped) > MAX_JSON_INPUT_BYTES
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or len(stripped.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")) > MAX_JSON_INPUT_BYTES
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):
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raise ValueError(
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f"JSON input exceeds maximum size of {MAX_JSON_INPUT_BYTES} bytes"
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)
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try:
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parsed = validate_json_depth_and_size(stripped)
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parsed = validate_json_depth_and_size(stripped)
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except json.JSONDecodeError:
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return [stripped]
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else:
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else:
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if stripped.startswith("compose:"):
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if stripped.startswith("compose:"):
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validate_compose_syntax(stripped)
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validate_compose_syntax(stripped)
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@@ -838,7 +881,7 @@ def validate_fallback_entries(
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if user_val is not None and not isinstance(user_val, str):
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if user_val is not None and not isinstance(user_val, str):
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raise ValueError(f"Fallback entry {idx} 'user' must be a string")
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raise ValueError(f"Fallback entry {idx} 'user' must be a string")
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if isinstance(pw_val, (list, tuple)):
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if isinstance(pw_val, (list, tuple)):
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if not pw_val or not all(isinstance(p, str) for p in pw_val):
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if not pw_val or not all(isinstance(p, str) and p != "" for p in pw_val):
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raise ValueError(
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raise ValueError(
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f"Fallback entry {idx} 'password' list must contain non-empty strings"
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f"Fallback entry {idx} 'password' list must contain non-empty strings"
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)
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)
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@@ -861,6 +904,15 @@ def validate_fallback_entries(
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return normalized
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return normalized
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def _is_profile_ref(value: Any) -> bool:
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"""Return True if value matches @profile reference syntax (not compose or literal)."""
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return (
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isinstance(value, str)
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and value.startswith("@")
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and bool(_PROFILE_REF_BODY_RE.fullmatch(value[1:]))
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)
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def _resolve_profile_field(
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def _resolve_profile_field(
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profiles: dict[str, Any],
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profiles: dict[str, Any],
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prof_name: str,
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prof_name: str,
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@@ -870,21 +922,40 @@ def _resolve_profile_field(
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visited: frozenset[str] = frozenset(),
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visited: frozenset[str] = frozenset(),
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) -> Any:
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) -> Any:
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if prof_name in visited or depth >= MAX_PROFILE_DEPTH:
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if prof_name in visited or depth >= MAX_PROFILE_DEPTH:
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return ""
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raise ValueError(f"Circular or overly deep profile reference: {prof_name}")
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prof = profiles.get(prof_name)
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if prof_name not in profiles or profiles[prof_name] is None:
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raise ValueError(f"Referenced profile does not exist: {prof_name}")
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prof = profiles[prof_name]
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if not isinstance(prof, dict):
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if not isinstance(prof, dict):
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return ""
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raise TypeError(f"Invalid profile definition for {prof_name!r}: expected dict")
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val = prof.get(field, "")
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val = prof.get(field, "")
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if isinstance(val, str) and val.startswith("@") and "+" not in val:
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next_visited = visited | {prof_name}
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ref = val[1:]
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if _is_profile_ref(val):
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if ref in profiles:
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return _resolve_profile_field(
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return _resolve_profile_field(
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profiles,
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profiles,
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ref,
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val[1:],
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field,
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field,
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depth=depth + 1,
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depth=depth + 1,
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visited=visited | {prof_name},
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visited=next_visited,
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)
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)
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if field == "password" and isinstance(val, (list, tuple)):
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resolved_items: list[Any] = []
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for item in val:
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if _is_profile_ref(item):
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sub = _resolve_profile_field(
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profiles,
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item[1:],
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field,
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depth=depth + 1,
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visited=next_visited,
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)
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if isinstance(sub, list):
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resolved_items.extend(deepcopy(sub))
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elif sub is not None:
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resolved_items.append(deepcopy(sub))
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else:
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resolved_items.append(deepcopy(item))
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return resolved_items
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return deepcopy(val)
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return deepcopy(val)
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@@ -906,18 +977,41 @@ def _resolve_fallback_entries_internal(
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if isinstance(entry, str):
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if isinstance(entry, str):
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if entry.startswith("compose:"):
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if entry.startswith("compose:"):
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resolved.append({"user": "", "password": entry})
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resolved.append({"user": "", "password": entry})
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elif entry.startswith("@") and "+" not in entry:
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elif _is_profile_ref(entry):
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ref_name = entry[1:]
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ref_name = entry[1:]
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if ref_name not in prof_map:
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if ref_name in _visited or _depth >= MAX_PROFILE_DEPTH:
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resolved.append({"user": "", "password": ""})
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elif ref_name in _visited or _depth >= MAX_PROFILE_DEPTH:
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raise ValueError(
|
raise ValueError(
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f"Circular or overly deep fallback profile reference: {ref_name}"
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f"Circular or overly deep fallback profile reference: {ref_name}"
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)
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)
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else:
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if ref_name not in prof_map or prof_map[ref_name] is None:
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raise ValueError(f"Referenced fallback profile does not exist: {ref_name}")
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if not isinstance(prof_map[ref_name], dict):
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raise TypeError(
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f"Invalid fallback profile definition for {ref_name!r}: expected dict"
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)
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|
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prof_obj = prof_map[ref_name]
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prof_obj = prof_map[ref_name]
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prof_fb = prof_obj.get("fallback") if isinstance(prof_obj, dict) else None
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u = _resolve_profile_field(
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prof_map, ref_name, "user", depth=_depth, visited=_visited
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)
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p = _resolve_profile_field(
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prof_map, ref_name, "password", depth=_depth, visited=_visited
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)
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own_user = str(u) if u not in (None, "") else ""
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own_pw: Any = p if p not in (None, "", []) else ""
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prof_fb = prof_obj.get("fallback")
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if prof_fb not in (None, "", []):
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if prof_fb not in (None, "", []):
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has_own = (
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bool(own_user)
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or (isinstance(own_pw, list) and bool(own_pw))
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or (isinstance(own_pw, str) and own_pw != "")
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)
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|
if has_own:
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|
if len(resolved) >= max_entries:
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|
raise ValueError(
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|
f"Fallback exceeds maximum of {max_entries} entries"
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|
)
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resolved.append({"user": own_user, "password": own_pw})
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sub_entries = _resolve_fallback_entries_internal(
|
sub_entries = _resolve_fallback_entries_internal(
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prof_fb,
|
prof_fb,
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prof_map,
|
prof_map,
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@@ -932,45 +1026,45 @@ def _resolve_fallback_entries_internal(
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)
|
)
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resolved.append(sub)
|
resolved.append(sub)
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else:
|
else:
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u = _resolve_profile_field(prof_map, ref_name, "user")
|
if len(resolved) >= max_entries:
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p = _resolve_profile_field(prof_map, ref_name, "password")
|
raise ValueError(
|
||||||
resolved.append({"user": u or "", "password": p if p is not None else ""})
|
f"Fallback exceeds maximum of {max_entries} entries"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
resolved.append({"user": own_user, "password": own_pw})
|
||||||
else:
|
else:
|
||||||
resolved.append({"user": "", "password": entry})
|
resolved.append({"user": "", "password": entry})
|
||||||
elif isinstance(entry, dict):
|
elif isinstance(entry, dict):
|
||||||
user_raw = entry.get("user", "")
|
user_raw = entry.get("user", "")
|
||||||
pw_raw = entry.get("password", "")
|
pw_raw = entry.get("password", "")
|
||||||
if isinstance(user_raw, str) and user_raw.startswith("@") and "+" not in user_raw:
|
if _is_profile_ref(user_raw):
|
||||||
user_res = _resolve_profile_field(prof_map, user_raw[1:], "user") or ""
|
u_val = _resolve_profile_field(
|
||||||
|
prof_map, user_raw[1:], "user", depth=_depth, visited=_visited
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
user_res = str(u_val) if u_val not in (None, "") else ""
|
||||||
else:
|
else:
|
||||||
user_res = user_raw or ""
|
user_res = user_raw or ""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if isinstance(pw_raw, (list, tuple)):
|
if isinstance(pw_raw, (list, tuple)):
|
||||||
pw_res_list: list[str] = []
|
pw_res_list: list[str] = []
|
||||||
for p_item in pw_raw:
|
for p_item in pw_raw:
|
||||||
if (
|
if _is_profile_ref(p_item):
|
||||||
isinstance(p_item, str)
|
resolved_pw = _resolve_profile_field(
|
||||||
and p_item.startswith("@")
|
prof_map, p_item[1:], "password", depth=_depth, visited=_visited
|
||||||
and not p_item.startswith("compose:")
|
)
|
||||||
and p_item[1:] in prof_map
|
|
||||||
):
|
|
||||||
resolved_pw = _resolve_profile_field(prof_map, p_item[1:], "password")
|
|
||||||
if isinstance(resolved_pw, list):
|
if isinstance(resolved_pw, list):
|
||||||
pw_res_list.extend(str(x) for x in resolved_pw)
|
pw_res_list.extend(str(x) for x in resolved_pw if x != "")
|
||||||
else:
|
elif resolved_pw not in (None, ""):
|
||||||
pw_res_list.append(str(resolved_pw or ""))
|
pw_res_list.append(str(resolved_pw))
|
||||||
else:
|
else:
|
||||||
pw_res_list.append(str(p_item))
|
pw_res_list.append(str(p_item))
|
||||||
|
if not pw_res_list:
|
||||||
|
raise ValueError("Fallback entry password list resolved to empty")
|
||||||
pw_res: str | list[str] = pw_res_list
|
pw_res: str | list[str] = pw_res_list
|
||||||
elif (
|
elif _is_profile_ref(pw_raw):
|
||||||
isinstance(pw_raw, str)
|
resolved_pw = _resolve_profile_field(
|
||||||
and pw_raw.startswith("@")
|
prof_map, pw_raw[1:], "password", depth=_depth, visited=_visited
|
||||||
and not pw_raw.startswith("compose:")
|
)
|
||||||
and pw_raw[1:] in prof_map
|
pw_res = resolved_pw if resolved_pw is not None else ""
|
||||||
):
|
|
||||||
pw_res = _resolve_profile_field(prof_map, pw_raw[1:], "password")
|
|
||||||
if pw_res is None:
|
|
||||||
pw_res = ""
|
|
||||||
else:
|
else:
|
||||||
pw_res = pw_raw if pw_raw is not None else ""
|
pw_res = pw_raw if pw_raw is not None else ""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -996,8 +1090,7 @@ def resolve_fallback_entries(
|
|||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
def extract_profile_refs_from_value(value: Any) -> set[str]:
|
def _extract_profile_refs_internal(value: Any, seen: set[int]) -> set[str]:
|
||||||
"""Extract all @profile names referenced directly or via compose:/fallback in a value."""
|
|
||||||
refs: set[str] = set()
|
refs: set[str] = set()
|
||||||
if isinstance(value, str):
|
if isinstance(value, str):
|
||||||
stripped = value.strip()
|
stripped = value.strip()
|
||||||
@@ -1005,17 +1098,32 @@ def extract_profile_refs_from_value(value: Any) -> set[str]:
|
|||||||
refs.update(extract_compose_profile_refs(stripped))
|
refs.update(extract_compose_profile_refs(stripped))
|
||||||
elif stripped.startswith("@") and _PROFILE_REF_BODY_RE.fullmatch(stripped[1:]):
|
elif stripped.startswith("@") and _PROFILE_REF_BODY_RE.fullmatch(stripped[1:]):
|
||||||
refs.add(stripped[1:])
|
refs.add(stripped[1:])
|
||||||
elif stripped.startswith(("[", "{")):
|
elif (
|
||||||
with suppress(ValueError, TypeError):
|
stripped.startswith(("[", "{"))
|
||||||
|
and len(stripped) <= MAX_JSON_INPUT_BYTES
|
||||||
|
and len(stripped.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")) <= MAX_JSON_INPUT_BYTES
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
with suppress(ValueError, TypeError, RecursionError):
|
||||||
parsed = json.loads(stripped)
|
parsed = json.loads(stripped)
|
||||||
refs.update(extract_profile_refs_from_value(parsed))
|
refs.update(_extract_profile_refs_internal(parsed, seen))
|
||||||
elif isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
|
elif isinstance(value, (list, tuple, dict)):
|
||||||
for item in value:
|
obj_id = id(value)
|
||||||
refs.update(extract_profile_refs_from_value(item))
|
if obj_id in seen:
|
||||||
elif isinstance(value, dict):
|
|
||||||
for v in value.values():
|
|
||||||
refs.update(extract_profile_refs_from_value(v))
|
|
||||||
return refs
|
return refs
|
||||||
|
seen.add(obj_id)
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
items = value.values() if isinstance(value, dict) else value
|
||||||
|
for item in items:
|
||||||
|
with suppress(RecursionError):
|
||||||
|
refs.update(_extract_profile_refs_internal(item, seen))
|
||||||
|
finally:
|
||||||
|
seen.discard(obj_id)
|
||||||
|
return refs
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def extract_profile_refs_from_value(value: Any) -> set[str]:
|
||||||
|
"""Extract all @profile names referenced directly or via compose:/fallback in a value."""
|
||||||
|
return _extract_profile_refs_internal(value, set())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
def validate_auth_budget_tags(tags: Any) -> None:
|
def validate_auth_budget_tags(tags: Any) -> None:
|
||||||
@@ -1164,8 +1272,17 @@ class AuthAttemptTracker:
|
|||||||
default_max_global_user_attempts: int | None = None,
|
default_max_global_user_attempts: int | None = None,
|
||||||
clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic,
|
clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic,
|
||||||
) -> None:
|
) -> None:
|
||||||
self._ttl_seconds = float(ttl_seconds)
|
if isinstance(ttl_seconds, bool) or not isinstance(ttl_seconds, (int, float)):
|
||||||
self._max_entries = int(max_entries)
|
raise TypeError(f"Invalid ttl_seconds: expected number > 0, got {ttl_seconds!r}")
|
||||||
|
ttl_val = float(ttl_seconds)
|
||||||
|
if not math.isfinite(ttl_val) or ttl_val <= 0:
|
||||||
|
raise ValueError(f"Invalid ttl_seconds: expected > 0, got {ttl_seconds!r}")
|
||||||
|
if isinstance(max_entries, bool) or not isinstance(max_entries, int):
|
||||||
|
raise TypeError(f"Invalid max_entries: expected int >= 1, got {max_entries!r}")
|
||||||
|
if max_entries < 1:
|
||||||
|
raise ValueError(f"Invalid max_entries: expected >= 1, got {max_entries!r}")
|
||||||
|
self._ttl_seconds = ttl_val
|
||||||
|
self._max_entries = max_entries
|
||||||
self._default_max_host_attempts = int(default_max_host_attempts)
|
self._default_max_host_attempts = int(default_max_host_attempts)
|
||||||
self._default_max_hop_attempts = int(default_max_hop_attempts)
|
self._default_max_hop_attempts = int(default_max_hop_attempts)
|
||||||
self._default_max_global_user_attempts = default_max_global_user_attempts
|
self._default_max_global_user_attempts = default_max_global_user_attempts
|
||||||
@@ -1209,29 +1326,30 @@ class AuthAttemptTracker:
|
|||||||
return entry
|
return entry
|
||||||
return None
|
return None
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
def try_acquire(self, key: Any, *, limit: int) -> bool:
|
def _can_acquire_unlocked(self, key: Any, limit: int, now: float) -> bool:
|
||||||
"""Attempt to consume 1 attempt slot for key within limit. Returns False if exhausted."""
|
|
||||||
if limit <= 0:
|
if limit <= 0:
|
||||||
return False
|
return False
|
||||||
now = self._clock()
|
|
||||||
with self._lock:
|
|
||||||
entry = self._get_live_entry_unlocked(key, now)
|
entry = self._get_live_entry_unlocked(key, now)
|
||||||
if entry is None:
|
if entry is None:
|
||||||
self._evict_if_full_unlocked(now)
|
|
||||||
new_count = 1
|
|
||||||
new_entry = _BudgetEntry(count=new_count, limit=limit, last_ts=now)
|
|
||||||
if new_count >= limit:
|
|
||||||
self._blocked[key] = new_entry
|
|
||||||
else:
|
|
||||||
self._unblocked[key] = new_entry
|
|
||||||
return True
|
return True
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if entry.count >= limit:
|
if entry.count >= limit:
|
||||||
entry.limit = limit
|
entry.limit = limit
|
||||||
if key in self._unblocked:
|
if key in self._unblocked:
|
||||||
del self._unblocked[key]
|
del self._unblocked[key]
|
||||||
self._blocked[key] = entry
|
self._blocked[key] = entry
|
||||||
return False
|
return False
|
||||||
|
return True
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _commit_acquire_unlocked(self, key: Any, limit: int, now: float) -> None:
|
||||||
|
entry = self._get_live_entry_unlocked(key, now)
|
||||||
|
if entry is None:
|
||||||
|
self._evict_if_full_unlocked(now)
|
||||||
|
new_entry = _BudgetEntry(count=1, limit=limit, last_ts=now)
|
||||||
|
if 1 >= limit:
|
||||||
|
self._blocked[key] = new_entry
|
||||||
|
else:
|
||||||
|
self._unblocked[key] = new_entry
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
entry.count += 1
|
entry.count += 1
|
||||||
entry.limit = limit
|
entry.limit = limit
|
||||||
@@ -1246,8 +1364,46 @@ class AuthAttemptTracker:
|
|||||||
del self._blocked[key]
|
del self._blocked[key]
|
||||||
self._unblocked[key] = entry
|
self._unblocked[key] = entry
|
||||||
self._unblocked.move_to_end(key)
|
self._unblocked.move_to_end(key)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def try_acquire(self, key: Any, *, limit: int) -> bool:
|
||||||
|
"""Attempt to consume 1 attempt slot for key within limit. Returns False if exhausted."""
|
||||||
|
if limit <= 0:
|
||||||
|
return False
|
||||||
|
now = self._clock()
|
||||||
|
with self._lock:
|
||||||
|
if not self._can_acquire_unlocked(key, limit, now):
|
||||||
|
return False
|
||||||
|
self._commit_acquire_unlocked(key, limit, now)
|
||||||
return True
|
return True
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def try_acquire_target_attempt(
|
||||||
|
self,
|
||||||
|
*,
|
||||||
|
host: str,
|
||||||
|
port: str = "",
|
||||||
|
protocol: str = "ssh",
|
||||||
|
user: str = "",
|
||||||
|
host_limit: int | None = None,
|
||||||
|
user_limit: int | None = None,
|
||||||
|
) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
|
||||||
|
"""Atomically verify and consume both user and host attempt slots under one lock."""
|
||||||
|
eff_host_limit = self._default_max_host_attempts if host_limit is None else int(host_limit)
|
||||||
|
eff_user_limit = self._default_max_global_user_attempts if user_limit is None else user_limit
|
||||||
|
host_key = self._host_key(host, port, protocol)
|
||||||
|
user_key = self._user_key(user) if (user and eff_user_limit is not None) else None
|
||||||
|
now = self._clock()
|
||||||
|
with self._lock:
|
||||||
|
if user_key is not None and not self._can_acquire_unlocked(
|
||||||
|
user_key, int(eff_user_limit), now
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
return False, "USER_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED"
|
||||||
|
if not self._can_acquire_unlocked(host_key, eff_host_limit, now):
|
||||||
|
return False, "HOST_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED"
|
||||||
|
if user_key is not None:
|
||||||
|
self._commit_acquire_unlocked(user_key, int(eff_user_limit), now)
|
||||||
|
self._commit_acquire_unlocked(host_key, eff_host_limit, now)
|
||||||
|
return True, None
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
def remaining(self, key: Any, *, limit: int) -> int:
|
def remaining(self, key: Any, *, limit: int) -> int:
|
||||||
"""Return remaining attempt quota for key."""
|
"""Return remaining attempt quota for key."""
|
||||||
now = self._clock()
|
now = self._clock()
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import yaml
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
from . import printer
|
from . import printer
|
||||||
from .auth_utils import (
|
from .auth_utils import (
|
||||||
|
MAX_PROFILE_DEPTH,
|
||||||
SanitizedAuthError,
|
SanitizedAuthError,
|
||||||
extract_profile_refs_from_value,
|
extract_profile_refs_from_value,
|
||||||
is_compose_expression,
|
is_compose_expression,
|
||||||
@@ -607,8 +608,43 @@ class configfile:
|
|||||||
return sub if sub is not None else ""
|
return sub if sub is not None else ""
|
||||||
return deepcopy(val)
|
return deepcopy(val)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _find_inherited_profile_fallback_unlocked(self, raw_user, raw_pw):
|
||||||
|
"""Inherit fallback from a primary @profile referenced by node user/password."""
|
||||||
|
for candidate_val, field in ((raw_user, "user"), (raw_pw, "password")):
|
||||||
|
if (
|
||||||
|
isinstance(candidate_val, str)
|
||||||
|
and not is_compose_expression(candidate_val)
|
||||||
|
and candidate_val.startswith("@")
|
||||||
|
and "+" not in candidate_val
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
prof_name = candidate_val[1:]
|
||||||
|
visited = set()
|
||||||
|
while prof_name and prof_name not in visited and len(visited) < MAX_PROFILE_DEPTH:
|
||||||
|
visited.add(prof_name)
|
||||||
|
prof = self.profiles.get(prof_name)
|
||||||
|
if not isinstance(prof, dict):
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
prof_fb = prof.get("fallback")
|
||||||
|
if prof_fb in (None, "", []) and isinstance(prof.get("tags"), dict):
|
||||||
|
prof_fb = prof["tags"].get("fallback")
|
||||||
|
if prof_fb not in (None, "", []):
|
||||||
|
return deepcopy(prof_fb)
|
||||||
|
next_val = prof.get(field)
|
||||||
|
if (
|
||||||
|
isinstance(next_val, str)
|
||||||
|
and not is_compose_expression(next_val)
|
||||||
|
and next_val.startswith("@")
|
||||||
|
and "+" not in next_val
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
prof_name = next_val[1:]
|
||||||
|
else:
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
return None
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
def _extract_node_fields_unlocked(self, node_dict):
|
def _extract_node_fields_unlocked(self, node_dict):
|
||||||
"""Resolve @profile references on a copied node dict, keeping legacy core.node(**cfg) contract."""
|
"""Resolve @profile references on a copied node dict, keeping legacy core.node(**cfg) contract."""
|
||||||
|
raw_user = node_dict.get("user")
|
||||||
|
raw_pw = node_dict.get("password")
|
||||||
raw_fb = node_dict.pop("fallback", None)
|
raw_fb = node_dict.pop("fallback", None)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for key, value in list(node_dict.items()):
|
for key, value in list(node_dict.items()):
|
||||||
@@ -651,6 +687,13 @@ class configfile:
|
|||||||
default_proto = self.profiles.get("default", {}).get("protocol", "ssh")
|
default_proto = self.profiles.get("default", {}).get("protocol", "ssh")
|
||||||
node_dict[key] = default_proto if default_proto else "ssh"
|
node_dict[key] = default_proto if default_proto else "ssh"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
tags_fb_present = (
|
||||||
|
isinstance(node_dict.get("tags"), dict)
|
||||||
|
and node_dict["tags"].get("fallback") not in (None, "", [])
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
if raw_fb in (None, "", []) and not tags_fb_present:
|
||||||
|
raw_fb = self._find_inherited_profile_fallback_unlocked(raw_user, raw_pw)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
resolved_fb = []
|
resolved_fb = []
|
||||||
if raw_fb not in (None, "", []):
|
if raw_fb not in (None, "", []):
|
||||||
resolved_fb = resolve_fallback_entries(raw_fb, self.profiles)
|
resolved_fb = resolve_fallback_entries(raw_fb, self.profiles)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+13
-10
@@ -3287,18 +3287,21 @@ class node:
|
|||||||
return False, str(sanitize_exception(None, code="AUTH_FAILED", secrets=raw_secrets))
|
return False, str(sanitize_exception(None, code="AUTH_FAILED", secrets=raw_secrets))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
eff_u = cur_cand.user or str(self.user or "")
|
eff_u = cur_cand.user or str(self.user or "")
|
||||||
if not tracker.try_acquire_user(eff_u, limit=max_global_user_attempts):
|
acquired, budget_err_code = tracker.try_acquire_target_attempt(
|
||||||
return False, str(
|
host=str(self.host),
|
||||||
sanitize_exception(None, code="USER_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED", secrets=raw_secrets)
|
port=str(self.port or ""),
|
||||||
|
protocol=effective_protocol,
|
||||||
|
user=eff_u,
|
||||||
|
host_limit=max_total_auth_attempts,
|
||||||
|
user_limit=max_global_user_attempts,
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
if not tracker.try_acquire_host(
|
if not acquired:
|
||||||
str(self.host),
|
|
||||||
str(self.port or ""),
|
|
||||||
effective_protocol,
|
|
||||||
limit=max_total_auth_attempts,
|
|
||||||
):
|
|
||||||
return False, str(
|
return False, str(
|
||||||
sanitize_exception(None, code="HOST_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED", secrets=raw_secrets)
|
sanitize_exception(
|
||||||
|
None,
|
||||||
|
code=budget_err_code or "HOST_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED",
|
||||||
|
secrets=raw_secrets,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if cur_cand.is_fallback and not st["logged_fallback_this_cand"]:
|
if cur_cand.is_fallback and not st["logged_fallback_this_cand"]:
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ def test_sanitized_auth_error_pickle_and_dynamic_traceback_clearing() -> None:
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
assert sanitized_err is not None
|
assert sanitized_err is not None
|
||||||
assert sanitized_err.__cause__ is None
|
assert sanitized_err.__cause__ is None
|
||||||
|
assert sanitized_err.__context__ is None
|
||||||
assert sanitized_err.__suppress_context__ is True
|
assert sanitized_err.__suppress_context__ is True
|
||||||
formatted = "".join(
|
formatted = "".join(
|
||||||
traceback.format_exception(type(sanitized_err), sanitized_err, sanitized_err.__traceback__)
|
traceback.format_exception(type(sanitized_err), sanitized_err, sanitized_err.__traceback__)
|
||||||
@@ -908,6 +909,24 @@ def test_sanitized_auth_error_pickle_and_dynamic_traceback_clearing() -> None:
|
|||||||
assert orig_exc is not None
|
assert orig_exc is not None
|
||||||
assert orig_exc.__traceback__ is None
|
assert orig_exc.__traceback__ is None
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Exiting except before raising also keeps __context__ None at VM level
|
||||||
|
pending_err: SanitizedAuthError | None = None
|
||||||
|
captured_outer: SanitizedAuthError | None = None
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
_boom()
|
||||||
|
except ValueError as exc:
|
||||||
|
pending_err = sanitize_exception(exc, code="AUTH_FAILED", secrets=[secret_token])
|
||||||
|
if pending_err is not None:
|
||||||
|
pending_err.__context__ = None
|
||||||
|
raise pending_err from None
|
||||||
|
except SanitizedAuthError as outer:
|
||||||
|
captured_outer = outer
|
||||||
|
assert captured_outer is not None
|
||||||
|
assert captured_outer.__context__ is None
|
||||||
|
assert captured_outer.__cause__ is None
|
||||||
|
assert captured_outer.__suppress_context__ is True
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
def test_ast_allowlist_and_no_raw_traceback_or_stdin_in_auth_surfaces() -> None:
|
def test_ast_allowlist_and_no_raw_traceback_or_stdin_in_auth_surfaces() -> None:
|
||||||
forbidden_tb_attrs = {"print_exc", "format_exc", "format_exception", "print_tb"}
|
forbidden_tb_attrs = {"print_exc", "format_exc", "format_exception", "print_tb"}
|
||||||
@@ -1414,3 +1433,249 @@ def test_nodes_group_fallback_tracking(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.Monke
|
|||||||
executor.run(["show version"], parallel=1)
|
executor.run(["show version"], parallel=1)
|
||||||
assert executor.status["n1"] == 0
|
assert executor.status["n1"] == 0
|
||||||
assert executor.fallback_used == {"n1": True}
|
assert executor.fallback_used == {"n1": True}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_signoff_fallback_inheritance_fail_closed_json_masking_and_atomic_budgets(
|
||||||
|
tmp_path: Path,
|
||||||
|
) -> None:
|
||||||
|
# 1a. @profile in fallback with own credentials + sub-fallback emits own first then sub-entries
|
||||||
|
profiles_combo = {
|
||||||
|
"tac_combo": {"user": "tac_u", "password": "tac_p", "fallback": ["@bak1", "@bak2"]},
|
||||||
|
"bak1": {"user": "b1_u", "password": "b1_p"},
|
||||||
|
"bak2": {"user": "b2_u", "password": "b2_p"},
|
||||||
|
"empty_chain": {"user": "", "password": "", "fallback": ["@bak1"]},
|
||||||
|
"cyc_a": {"user": "@cyc_b", "password": "p"},
|
||||||
|
"cyc_b": {"user": "@cyc_a", "password": "p"},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
res_combo = resolve_fallback_entries(["@tac_combo"], profiles_combo)
|
||||||
|
assert res_combo == [
|
||||||
|
{"user": "tac_u", "password": "tac_p"},
|
||||||
|
{"user": "b1_u", "password": "b1_p"},
|
||||||
|
{"user": "b2_u", "password": "b2_p"},
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
assert resolve_fallback_entries(["@empty_chain"], profiles_combo) == [
|
||||||
|
{"user": "b1_u", "password": "b1_p"}
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Combined own + sub-fallback > MAX_FALLBACK_ENTRIES (5) fails closed
|
||||||
|
profiles_cap = {
|
||||||
|
"own_plus_4": {
|
||||||
|
"user": "u0",
|
||||||
|
"password": "p0",
|
||||||
|
"fallback": [{"user": f"u{i}", "password": f"p{i}"} for i in range(1, 5)],
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
"own_plus_5": {
|
||||||
|
"user": "u0",
|
||||||
|
"password": "p0",
|
||||||
|
"fallback": [{"user": f"u{i}", "password": f"p{i}"} for i in range(1, 6)],
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert len(resolve_fallback_entries(["@own_plus_4"], profiles_cap)) == MAX_FALLBACK_ENTRIES
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum"):
|
||||||
|
resolve_fallback_entries(["@own_plus_5"], profiles_cap)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# 1b. configfile.getitem(extract=True) inherits fallback from primary @profile when node omits it
|
||||||
|
cfg = _make_config(
|
||||||
|
tmp_path,
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"profiles": {
|
||||||
|
"default": {
|
||||||
|
"host": "",
|
||||||
|
"protocol": "ssh",
|
||||||
|
"port": "",
|
||||||
|
"user": "",
|
||||||
|
"password": "",
|
||||||
|
"options": "",
|
||||||
|
"logs": "",
|
||||||
|
"tags": "",
|
||||||
|
"jumphost": "",
|
||||||
|
"fallback": "",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
"tacacs": {
|
||||||
|
"host": "",
|
||||||
|
"protocol": "ssh",
|
||||||
|
"port": "",
|
||||||
|
"user": "tac_u",
|
||||||
|
"password": "tac_secret_password",
|
||||||
|
"options": "",
|
||||||
|
"logs": "",
|
||||||
|
"tags": "",
|
||||||
|
"jumphost": "",
|
||||||
|
"fallback": ["@local_bak"],
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
"local_bak": {
|
||||||
|
"host": "",
|
||||||
|
"protocol": "ssh",
|
||||||
|
"port": "",
|
||||||
|
"user": "loc_u",
|
||||||
|
"password": "loc_secret_password",
|
||||||
|
"options": "",
|
||||||
|
"logs": "",
|
||||||
|
"tags": "",
|
||||||
|
"jumphost": "",
|
||||||
|
"fallback": "",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
cfg._connections_add(id="r_inherit", host="10.0.0.10", user="@tacacs", password="@tacacs")
|
||||||
|
cfg._connections_add(
|
||||||
|
id="r_pw_inherit",
|
||||||
|
host="10.0.0.11",
|
||||||
|
user="custom_u",
|
||||||
|
password="@tacacs",
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
cfg._connections_add(
|
||||||
|
id="r_explicit_fb",
|
||||||
|
host="10.0.0.12",
|
||||||
|
user="@tacacs",
|
||||||
|
password="@tacacs",
|
||||||
|
fallback=[{"user": "override_u", "password": "override_pw"}],
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
cfg._saveconfig(cfg.file)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ext_inherit = cfg.getitem("r_inherit", extract=True)
|
||||||
|
assert ext_inherit["user"] == "tac_u"
|
||||||
|
assert ext_inherit["password"] == "tac_secret_password"
|
||||||
|
assert ext_inherit["tags"]["_fallback"] == [
|
||||||
|
{"user": "loc_u", "password": "loc_secret_password"}
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
assert "tags" not in cfg.connections["r_inherit"] or "_fallback" not in str(
|
||||||
|
cfg.connections["r_inherit"].get("tags", "")
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
n_inherit = NodeClass("r_inherit", **ext_inherit, config=cfg)
|
||||||
|
assert [c.user for c in n_inherit._auth_candidates] == ["tac_u", "loc_u"]
|
||||||
|
assert [c.is_fallback for c in n_inherit._auth_candidates] == [False, True]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ext_pw = cfg.getitem("r_pw_inherit", extract=True)
|
||||||
|
assert ext_pw["tags"]["_fallback"] == [{"user": "loc_u", "password": "loc_secret_password"}]
|
||||||
|
ext_exp = cfg.getitem("r_explicit_fb", extract=True)
|
||||||
|
assert ext_exp["tags"]["_fallback"] == [{"user": "override_u", "password": "override_pw"}]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# 2. Fail-closed on missing refs, cycles, depth, rsa_blob without decrypt_fn, and empty list passwords
|
||||||
|
for bad_fb in (
|
||||||
|
["@missing"],
|
||||||
|
[{"user": "@missing", "password": "pw"}],
|
||||||
|
[{"user": "u", "password": "@missing"}],
|
||||||
|
[{"user": "u", "password": ["@missing"]}],
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
|
||||||
|
resolve_fallback_entries(bad_fb, profiles_combo)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Circular"):
|
||||||
|
auth_utils._resolve_profile_field(profiles_combo, "cyc_a", "user")
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Circular"):
|
||||||
|
auth_utils._resolve_profile_field({"p": {"password": "x"}}, "p", "password", depth=MAX_PROFILE_DEPTH)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rsa_blob = _encrypt_with_config(cfg, "RSA_SECRET")
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(SanitizedAuthError) as exc_rsa:
|
||||||
|
parse_compose_expression(f"compose:{rsa_blob}+'1'", profiles=cfg.profiles, decrypt_fn=None)
|
||||||
|
assert exc_rsa.value.code == "NO_CREDS"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(SanitizedAuthError) as exc_rsa_prof:
|
||||||
|
parse_compose_expression(
|
||||||
|
"compose:@rsa_prof",
|
||||||
|
profiles={"rsa_prof": {"password": rsa_blob}},
|
||||||
|
decrypt_fn=None,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
assert exc_rsa_prof.value.code == "NO_CREDS"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="non-empty strings"):
|
||||||
|
validate_fallback_entries([{"user": "u", "password": ["ok", ""]}])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Literal @foo+bar still allowed inside fallback entries
|
||||||
|
assert resolve_fallback_entries([{"user": "u", "password": "@foo+bar"}], {}) == [
|
||||||
|
{"user": "u", "password": "@foo+bar"}
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# 3. Control chars stripped BEFORE redacting (< 4 char + split secrets) & __context__ is None on compose decrypt error
|
||||||
|
assert sanitize_log_message("pw=p\x071\x1b[31m ok", secrets=["p1"]) == "pw=*** ok"
|
||||||
|
assert (
|
||||||
|
sanitize_log_message("pw=Sec\x00\nRet99\x1b[32m!", secrets=["SecRet99"]) == "pw=***!"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _bad_decrypt(_blob: str) -> str:
|
||||||
|
secret = "InnerKeySecret#99"
|
||||||
|
raise RuntimeError(f"decrypt error {secret}")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(SanitizedAuthError) as dec_err_info:
|
||||||
|
parse_compose_expression(f"compose:{rsa_blob}", profiles={}, decrypt_fn=_bad_decrypt)
|
||||||
|
assert dec_err_info.value.__context__ is None
|
||||||
|
assert dec_err_info.value.__cause__ is None
|
||||||
|
assert dec_err_info.value.__suppress_context__ is True
|
||||||
|
assert "InnerKeySecret" not in str(dec_err_info.value)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# 4. RecursionError protection on deep JSON & literal passwords starting with '[' or '{'
|
||||||
|
deep_json = "[" * 1500 + "1" + "]" * 1500
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
|
||||||
|
validate_json_depth_and_size(deep_json)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
deep_ref_json = "[" * 1500 + '"@tacacs"' + "]" * 1500
|
||||||
|
assert extract_profile_refs_from_value(deep_ref_json) == set()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assert validate_fallback_entries("{Admin}123") == ["{Admin}123"]
|
||||||
|
assert validate_fallback_entries("[Pa$$") == ["[Pa$$"]
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
|
||||||
|
validate_fallback_entries("[[[[[1]]]]]")
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
|
||||||
|
validate_fallback_entries("[" + "a" * 9000)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# 5a. mask_node_secrets masks tags._fallback from fresh getitem(extract=True)
|
||||||
|
masked_extracted = mask_node_secrets(cfg.getitem("r_inherit", extract=True))
|
||||||
|
assert masked_extracted["password"] == "***"
|
||||||
|
assert masked_extracted["tags"]["_fallback"] == [{"user": "loc_u", "password": "***"}]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# 5b. AuthAttemptTracker parameter validation & atomic multi-budget acquisition
|
||||||
|
for bad_ttl in (0, -5, float("nan"), float("inf")):
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
|
||||||
|
AuthAttemptTracker(ttl_seconds=bad_ttl)
|
||||||
|
for bad_bool_ttl in (True, False, "10"):
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
|
||||||
|
AuthAttemptTracker(ttl_seconds=bad_bool_ttl)
|
||||||
|
for bad_entries in (0, -1):
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
|
||||||
|
AuthAttemptTracker(max_entries=bad_entries)
|
||||||
|
for bad_bool_entries in (True, False, "5"):
|
||||||
|
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
|
||||||
|
AuthAttemptTracker(max_entries=bad_bool_entries)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Exhaust host budget first -> trying (user='shared_u', host='locked.host') must NOT consume user budget
|
||||||
|
t_atomic = AuthAttemptTracker(default_max_host_attempts=1, default_max_global_user_attempts=1)
|
||||||
|
assert t_atomic.try_acquire_host("locked.host", "22", "ssh", limit=1) is True
|
||||||
|
assert t_atomic.remaining_user("shared_u", limit=1) == 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ok, code = t_atomic.try_acquire_target_attempt(
|
||||||
|
host="locked.host",
|
||||||
|
port="22",
|
||||||
|
protocol="ssh",
|
||||||
|
user="shared_u",
|
||||||
|
host_limit=1,
|
||||||
|
user_limit=1,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
assert ok is False
|
||||||
|
assert code == "HOST_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED"
|
||||||
|
assert t_atomic.remaining_user("shared_u", limit=1) == 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Full _connect flow: host exhausted must return HOST_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED and leave shared_u intact
|
||||||
|
n_locked = NodeClass(
|
||||||
|
"r_locked",
|
||||||
|
host="locked.host",
|
||||||
|
port="22",
|
||||||
|
user="shared_u",
|
||||||
|
password="secret_pw",
|
||||||
|
tags={"max_total_auth_attempts": 1, "max_global_user_attempts": 1},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _spawn_prompt(*_a, **_kw):
|
||||||
|
ch = _make_mock_child(
|
||||||
|
expect_fn=lambda _p, timeout=None: (
|
||||||
|
setattr(ch, "after", b"Password:"),
|
||||||
|
8,
|
||||||
|
)[-1]
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
return ch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
with patch("connpy.core.pexpect.spawn", side_effect=_spawn_prompt):
|
||||||
|
res_locked = n_locked._connect(unattended=True, attempt_tracker=t_atomic)
|
||||||
|
assert "[HOST_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED]" in str(res_locked)
|
||||||
|
assert t_atomic.remaining_user("shared_u", limit=1) == 1
|
||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user